This week, seventy years ago, units of the German Wehrmacht were making their last preparations for the Battle of France. Columns stretched from the border a hundred miles. Because of congestion, it would take two weeks to get all the units across the border.
    Even before all of the fighting had ceased in Poland, the German Government launched a peace offensive directed at Great Britain and, primarily, France.  German intelligence had reported there was a significant peace attitude in the population of France and its Government.  That it had entered the War unenthusiastically was reflected in the performance of its Armed Forces so far.
    Speaking in the Guild Hall in the former free city of Danzig on September 19, 1939, the German Führer had stated, “I have no war aims against Great Britain and France. My sympathies are with the French Poilu. What he is fighting for, he does not know.”  German media launched the peace offensive on September 26th.
    Days later German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop signed the “German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty,” which finalized the fourth partition of Poland, and once again erased it from the map of Europe, and transferred Lithuania from the German “sphere of influence” to that of the Soviet Union. In announcing this event Foreign Ministers Vyacheslav Molotov and von Ribbentrop issued a statement stating that the Soviet and German Governments having,
“... definitely settled the problems arising from the disintegration of the Polish State and created a firm foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interests of all peoples to put an end to the state of war between Germany and England and France.  Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts...toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.
    Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war...”
    In the meantime, Hitler gathered the Army brass and informed them of his decision to, “...attack in the West as soon as possible, since the Franco-British Army is not yet prepared.” The date for the attack was November 12th. On October the 9th he ordered planning to begin.
    By that time the British had sent all of nine infantry divisions to France compared to the one 110 mobilized by the Republic.  It was, as Churchill recognized, “a symbolic contribution.”
    Essentially, German plans were a modified version of the Schlieffen Plan used unsuccessfully in World War I. The modifications would be that, in addition to invading neutral Belgium, the Wehrmacht would also invade neutrals Holland and Luxembourg. The Germans knew that an attack along the French border, where France was protected by the Maginot Line, would be suicidal.  
    On November the 7th der Führer  reluctantly postponed the assault by three days because of bad weather, “...and the railway transport situation....”  
    Meanwhile, on the German side, another plan was being developed. Hitler had not liked the Plan delivered by the German General Staff, but he didn’t know how to fix it. The Senior General in the German Army, Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt didn’t like the plan either and did know how to fix it. As a matter of fact, his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Erich von Manstein, with input from armor specialist Lt. Gen. Heinz Guderian, was developing the plan which would ultimately carry the Wehrmacht to a stunning victory in France. This plan concentrated German armor at the main point of attack, which was at Sedan on the Meuse River.  To get there the Germans would have to move their tanks through the Ardennes Forrest, in Belgium, which the French had already determined was “impassible.”
    But, in order to implement the plan, it had to be accepted by Hitler and adopted by him. And, of course, this was in Army Group A’s sector, and Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt was the Commander of Army Group A. In effect, von Manstein’s Plan called for armor, and other mechanized forces, to be stripped from Army Group B under the command of General Fedor von Bock and added to General von Rundstedt’s Army Group A.  Now the trick was to get the Plan past the General Staff and before Hitler for his approval.  
    On January 10, 1940, a seeming disaster befell the Germans, in the form of what has become known as the “Mechelen Incident,” or “Reinberger Incident.” A Major Helmuth Reinberger, who was due in Cologne for a staff meeting on January the 10th, had been out drinking the night before, in Münster, where he met Major Erich Hoenmanns who offered him a ride in his Messerschmidt BF-108.  But on the way to Cologne, they got lost, had engine trouble and were forced to land.  The landing was a crash landing. Unfortunately, the German plane had landed in Belgian territory, and more unfortunately, Major Reinberger was carrying the plans for the invasion of France, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg scheduled to take place a week later. Though the two Germans tried to hide, and Major Reinberger tried to burn the plans, they were recovered by two Belgians, Sergeant Frans Habets and Private Gerard Rubens. The two Belgians took the two German Majors to be interrogated by Captain Arthur Rodrique. Once again Major Reinberger attempted to burn the documents by stuffing them into a burning stove. As he was doing so, he yelled in pain as he lifted the hot lid of the stove, alerting Captain Rodrique who turned and snatched the papers from the fire, burning his hand badly. The Belgian Captain yelled, “It’s always the same with you Germans! We treat you correctly, and you play a dirty trick like this.”
    On January 12th General Alfred Jodl told der Führer that, “...if the enemy is in possession of all the files, the situation is catastrophic!” However, the Belgians convinced the Germans that the documents had, indeed, been destroyed in the fire.  
    All of this, of course, required that the invasion date be postponed once again. In the meantime, General von Manstein, was being marginalized. The Chief-of-Staff of the German Army, Frans Halder, had him relieved from his post as Chief-of-Staff of Army Group A on January 27th and reassigned as Commander of an Army Corps in East Prussia. That assignment was to begin on February 9th. Somehow, this situation was brought to the attention of der Führer, who invited General von Manstein to Berlin to explain his proposal on February 17th. After listening to General von Manstein’s idea, Hitler ordered that the original plan be scrapped and the new one adopted, and that von Manstein’s orders be reversed and that he return to his position as Colonel-General von Rundstedt’s Chief-of-Staff with Army Group A.
    The upshot of all this was that the Allies now thought that they had the German plan of attack, and they began to counter that plan. Because neither Belgium nor The Netherlands would allow Allied Armed Forces on their territory, for fear of provoking a German attack, it was not until the Germans launched their assault, that the Allies could move into the two countries.  But once that occurred, the Allies played right into the new German strategy. By moving into Belgium and Holland they were essentially moving into the German trap, because now the German strategy called for a single drive to the Channel Coast splitting the Allied Forces. This is precisely what happened.
    The French had assembled 40 of their best divisions, which together with the 10 British divisions, were prepared to move east into Belgium and The Netherlands to meet the anticipated German attack. But this wasn’t World War I, it wasn’t the Schlieffen Plan and Paris was not the immediate objective. The objective was the destruction of the Allied armies. The thrust into The Low Countries was now a diversion, with the main attack coming further south, through the Ardennes Forrest.
    On May 10, the German Wehrmacht unleashed its new plan. The Luftwaffe quickly achieved air superiority by attacking Allied air bases and destroying many planes on the ground. Once the River Muese had been crossed, at Sedan, the Germans turned right and headed for the English Channel, instead of going straight for Paris as was expected by the Allies. And if the older Generals in Berlin had not been so concerned about the tanks being cut off, and had not interfered with their advance by requiring them to slow and wait for the infantry, the Germans would have reached the English Channel several days sooner and there probably would not have been time for the Allies to organize an evacuation at Dunkirk.
    The rapid advance was led by the Seventh Armored Division under the Command of General Erwin Rommel. The Division moved so quickly that it acquired the name “Ghost Division” because no one knew where it was. Within a week, his division had captured 10,000 prisoners, while suffering 36 casualties. The rapid advance of the land forces was helped immeasurably by the ground-support tactics of General Baron Wolfram von Richthofen’s planes. The superiority of the Luftwaffe and the originality of General von Manstein’s plan were the keys to victory.
    On May 15, 1940, French Premier Paul Reynaud telephoned the new British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, and wailed, “We have been defeated. We are beaten. We have lost the battle.” The new P.M. flew to Paris the next day, and asked French Commander-in-Chief, 68-year-old General Maurice Gamelin, “Where is the strategic reserve?” The General replied, “There is none.” Two days later, he was replaced by 73-year-old Maxime Weygand.
    It is hard to imagine a more successful plan. In fact, it succeeded beyond the Germans’ wildest dreams. It, quite literally, stunned the entire world. Prior to this, France was thought to have the most powerful army in the world, with more tanks and guns than the Germans. In a matter of weeks it had been crushed, most of the country occupied, the British run off the continent and Belgium and The Netherlands overrun. The cost to the German Reich was 49,000 dead, 110,000 wounded and 18,500 missing. The Allies suffered 390,000 dead and wounded and 1,900,000 captured. Most of the captured were, of course, French soldiers. Neither country expected them to be held long. As soon as the war was over, i.e., an accommodation reached with Great Britain, a peace treaty would be executed and arrangements would be made for their release. At war’s end, 940,000 Frenchmen remained in captivity.
    The spot where the German plane crashed has been preserved with a stainless steel outline of the plane, a stone tablet and flags. The tablet contains a poem, in Dutch, which translated reads, “This is where, loaded with important documents, the first German eagle crashed. Young and old should remember well that four months after, the flood arrived.”
    And what of the two German majors? They were both condemned to death, in absentia. They would, however, survive the war by spending it in a POW camp in Canada. The same cannot be said for Major Hoenmanns’ family. His wife did not survive the Gestapo’s interrogation. His sons were allowed to join the army. They did not survive the war.
    
Mr. Wimbrow writes from Ocean City, Maryland, where he practices law representing those persons accused of criminal and traffic offenses, and those persons who have suffered a personal injury through no fault of their own.