THE WINTER WAR
Written By: Peter Ayers Wimbrow, III
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THE WINTER WAR
The Finnish representatives arriving in Moscow, October 16, 1939. From left: Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen, J.K. Paasikivi, Johan Nykopp and Aladár Paasonen.
THE WINTER WAR
Finnish Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustav von Mannerheim
THE WINTER WAR
Soviet Marshal Semyn Konstantinovich Timoshenko
THE WINTER WAR
From left to right behind Soviet Foregin Minister Molotov are Leningrad party boss Zhdanov, Marshal Kliment I Voroshilov, Stalin, and "make-believe" Finnish President, Otto Kuusinen.
THE WINTER WAR
Finnish areas ceded in 1940
THE WINTER WAR
Finnish Fighter Ace Eino Juutilanen
THE WINTER WAR
Sniper Simo Hayha on right
THE WINTER WAR
Finnish intelligent chief Aladar Paasonen
    This month, 70 years ago, the overwhelming numbers in men, artillery and armor  of the Red Army, together with the determination and utter disregard for human life of the Soviet Leaders, was beginning to overwhelm the tiny Country of Finland in what has become known as the Winter War.  Although the outcome was never really in doubt, the plucky Finns had managed to exact a terrible toll, in the first three weeks of the war, on the Soviets.
    The root causes of the war were twofold. One was the desire of the Soviet Union to reclaim those pieces of the former Russian Empire that had been ripped from it at the conclusion of the Great War.  This included the Grand Duchy of Finland, over which the Russian Czar had ruled since March 29, 1809, when that area had been wrested from Sweden by the armies of Czar Alexander I. During the upheavals created upon Russia’s exit from the Great War, and the ensuing revolution and Civil War, Finland, with German aid, obtained its independence.  However, its border was less than thirty miles from the Soviet Union’s second City, Leningrad, now and formerly St. Petersburg, which leads to the second cause of the war.  
    The Soviet Union was concerned with its security and felt that war with the resurgent German Reich was inevitable.  It was concerned with Finland’s ties with Germany, since it was only with German help that Finland had secured its independence.  Germany was fostering good relations with all Scandinavian Countries so that it would have ready access to Swedish iron ore, Finnish nickel, and other raw materials.  In addition to the proximity of the Finnish border to Leningrad there was the danger perceived by the Soviet government of the exposure of its Naval Base at Ronstadt in the Gulf of Finland, which was home to the Soviet Baltic fleet.  
    Beginning in 1938, the Soviet Union explained its concerns to the Finnish government and stated that it needed “positive guarantees” to assuage those concerns.  Negotiations were begun by Boris A. Rybkin in April of 1938.  The Finns really did not take these feelers seriously as Rybkin’s official position was as a Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki.  In reality he was an agent of the NKVD operating on Stalin’s direct authority.  
    These proposals had been made several years earlier by Leningrad Party Leader Andrei Zhdanov and the Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki, Eric Assmus.  As Europe moved toward war, the Soviet government got more serious and sent former Ambassador to finland, Boris Shtein, to negotiate with Finnish Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko. When Finnish Field Marshal, Baron Karl Gustav von Mannerheim, was asked his opinion, he advised Finland to cut its best deal with the Soviets because the Finns were not spending enough money on defense.  
    The Soviet government summoned the Finnish Leaders to Moscow on October 5, 1939, to discuss “concrete political questions.”  An RSVP was demanded within 48 hours. The Soviet Union had barely finished incorporating the eastern part of Poland and establishing bases in the three Baltic states!
    Finland sent its 70-year-old Ambassador to Sweden, Juho Paasikivi to represent it. The Finnish delegation, which included Johan Nykopp and intelligence chief, Colonel Aladár Paasonen, left Helsinki by train, on the evening of October 9, for Moscow.  
    When the Finnish delegation met the Soviets, the Soviet Union demanded that the border near Leningrad be moved westward to a point 30 kilometers east of Finland’s second largest city, Viipuri, that Finland cede to the Soviet Union the islands of Suursaari, Tytärsaari and Koivisto in the Gulf of Finland, as well as the Kalastajansaarento Peninsula, and lease the Hanko Peninsula for thirty years and permit the Soviets to establish a military base there.  In exchange the Soviets offered Ruppelii and Porajärvi in eastern Karelia.  The Soviets were offering territory twice as large as the territories they wanted. In making that offer, Stalin queried, “Would any other Big Power do that? No, only we are that stupid!”
    Ambassador Paasikivi asked for time to discuss the proposals with his government. In acquiescing to this request, Stalin impressed upon the Finns that time was of the essence since both countries were mobilizing and troops were moving toward the border. He explained, “This cannot go on for long without danger of accidents!”
    When the Finns returned to Helsinki, on October 16, the Ambassador told the waiting journalists that, “Mr. Stalin was a pleasant fellow with a sense of humor.”  Five days later, the Finns departed Helsinki again. The delegation, still led by the old Ambassador, was expanded to include Väinö Tanner, who was a Social Democrat and member of the Cabinet. In Leningrad, the delegation changed trains. The Soviet government provided a first-class car on the Red Star Express bound for Moscow.
    On October 23, the Finns met with the Soviets for the second time. They presented counter-proposals. Stalin responded by saying that Soviet demands were “minimal,” and that, therefore, haggling over them was pointless. He then produced a map, upon which he sketched Soviet requirements. At 8:00 P.M., the Finns departed for the Finnish embassy. At 9:00 P.M., the telephone rang summoning them to another meeting. At 11:00 P.M., a Packard arrived and whisked them back to the Kremlin, where some minor concessions were made by the Soviets.  The delegation left Moscow the next day, and, after changing trains in Leningrad, arrived in Helsinki October 25.
    On November 3, the Finnish delegation returned to Moscow. Before it left, Field Marshal von Mannerheim impressed upon the Ambassador, “You absolutely must come to an agreement! The Army cannot fight.”
    On November 9, the two parties met for the last time. The Finns announced that, “Finland cannot grant to a foreign state military bases on its own territory and within its own boundaries.”  After recovering from his shock, Stalin dejectedly said, “Then it doesn’t look as if anything will come of it.”
    On November 26, 1940, the “accident,” about which Stalin had warned a month earlier “occurred,” or more appropriately, was staged by the Soviets, at the border town of Mainila. Later that evening, Finnish representative Baron Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen was summoned to Molotov’s office and handed a note which reminded the Finn of Stalin’s warning about “accidents,” protested the “...deplorable act of aggression...” by the Finns, and suggested that they withdraw “...twenty to twenty-five kilometers, thus eliminating the possibility of fresh provocations.”  The Finns responded by denying responsibility for the accident and suggesting that each side withdraw an equal distance from the border. The Soviets answered that the Finnish reply typified, “...the deep hostility of the Finnish government toward the Soviet Union forcing the relations between the two countries to a point of extreme tension.”  It then broke diplomatic relations with Finland. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, said that, “Since we civilians can’t achieve anything, the matter has to be left to the military personnel.”
    On November 30, 1940, 465,000 Soviet soldiers, supported by 1000 planes under the command of Kirill Meretskov, attacked Finland on an 800 mile front. The Finnish defenders numbered 165,000 supported by 150 outdated planes. So confident were the Soviets of a quick and easy victory, that Comrade Zhdanov had commissioned the great composer, Dmitri Shostakovich, to create a new piece, “Suite on Finnish Themes,” to be played as the victorious Red Army marched through the Finnish capital of Helsinki on Stalin’s birthday, December 21. It would not be played until 2001.
    In addition to being vastly outnumbered, the Finns had no tanks and few antitank guns - against more than 2500 tanks for the aggressors. Therefore, they resorted to a weapon that had been developed in the Spanish Civil War. But the Finns would make it famous, when they named it the “Molotov Cocktail!” The Finns’ attitude was expressed when they said, “There are so many, and our country is so small, where will we find the room to bury them all.”
    In the meantime, the Soviets were organizing “The People’s Revolutionary Government” of “The Finnish Democratic Republic,” under Otto Ville Kuusinen, a Finnish communist who had lived in Moscow for two decades.
    The Finns appealed to the League of Nations. The Secretary-General, Joseph Avenol, convened the League. On behalf of the Soviet government, Foreign Minister Molotov replied that his country was not at war with Finland, that a treaty settling all questions between the two countries had been executed on December 2 with the new government, which had requested armed assistance against those revolting against that government.
    But after a month of determined Finnish resistance and Soviet ineptness, the Soviets: (1) suspended offensive operations; (2) signaled that they were amenable to negotiation with the real Finnish government; and (3) began to overhaul the leadership of their armies. General Meretskov was demoted to commander of the Seventh Army and replaced by General Semyon Timoshenko. As a result of his success, Timoshenko would be named Hero of the Soviet Union in March and Marshal of the Soviet Union in May.
    After a month of reorganizing, refitting, and bringing in Siberian ski troops to deal with those of Finland, Timoshenko struck on February 1, 1940.  The French and British had promised to help, but dithered until too late. Within two weeks, Finnish defenses began to fail and Field Marshal von Mannerheim, once again, urged his government to get the best terms it could. By March 5, Viipuri was surrounded. The Arctic port of Petsamo had already fallen. On March 12, an armistice was executed. The Soviet Union took 10 percent of Finnish territory, including the city of Viipuri, Finland’s second largest. Today, it is the Russian city of Vyborg, with a population of 90,000. Over 400,000 Finnish citizens were evacuated from the areas ceded to the U.S.S.R.
    The result of this little war was that after seeing the ill-equipped and under-strength Finnish Army savage the Red Army, Hitler became even more convinced that it was ripe for the plucking by the German Wehrmacht.  The Red Army suffered more than 400,000 casualties to less than 75,000 for the Finns. Another result was that once the German Reich decided to go to war, it now had an additional ally on the Soviet Union’s northern front. The Finns would call their participation in World War II, “The Continuation War.”
    During the Winter War, Finnish sniper, Simo Häyhä, became the all-time, undisputed, sniper leader with more than 542 kills of Soviet soldiers. It is a record which still stands. Finnish fighter pilot Eino (“Illu”) Ilmari Juutilanen finished the war with 94 confirmed victories over the Soviets, far exceeding the totals of any airmen except those from Germany.
    
Mr. Wimbrow writes from Ocean City, Maryland, where he practices law representing those persons accused of criminal and traffic offenses, and those persons who have suffered a personal injury through no fault of their own.
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