The Capture of Fort Eben Emael - 10-11 May 1940
Written By: Sam Ghaleb, Ridgecrest, CA
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The Capture of Fort Eben Emael - 10-11 May 1940
Fort Eban Emael
The Capture of Fort Eben Emael - 10-11 May 1940
Luftwaffe Gen. Kurt Student
The Capture of Fort Eben Emael - 10-11 May 1940
1st Lt. Rudolf Witzig
    Fort Eben Emael, named after a nearby village, was a product of World War I, when German forces overran Belgium on their way to France. In the period between the two World Wars, both Belgium and France embarked on massive projects to fortify their frontiers with Germany. In an effort to prevent the recurrence of World War I trench warfare, and the slaughter that accompanied it, the French government in the mid 1930s went on to build the Maginot Line that stretched from the Belgian to the Swiss border. And the Belgian Army leadership envisioned what was to become the most imaginative and formidable defensive network of forts the world had known.
    Fort Eben Emael was the centerpiece of the Belgian system of frontier fortifications. That system also included one of the world's wonders, the Albert Canal, an 80-mile long waterway and military barrier, controlled by a set of locks capable of flooding or emptying the entire waterway in an hour. Located along the length of the Albert Canal were a series of forts with interlocking fields of fire. One of these forts was Fort Eben Emael. It was situated on a high cliff overlooking the Meuse River, and its position provided a clear view over the Albert Canal and the Meuse River for miles. The fort was also located between the two Belgian cities of Maastricht to the north, and the large city of Liege to the south. It was constructed in 1931–1935 for a cost of 35 million francs.
    The entire fort complex was composed of networks of machinegun bunkers, large casements of steel reinforced concrete which bristled with antitank guns, machine guns, and surrounded with a maze of barbed wire and triangular steel antitank obstacles. The entire fort measured 3,300 feet long from north to south and 2,400 feet across. It contained underground ammunition storage facilities, repair shops, communication center, command post, and living quarters for a 1,200-men garrison. Above the ground there were distinctive looking dome shaped cupolas made of foot-thick steel and housed 75mm and 120mm guns with a range of 12 miles.
    After the German and Slovakian invasion of Poland, in September 1939, Germany’s eyes now turned to the west to face the newly formed alliance of British and French forces assembled along Germany’s western borders. Hitler sought to solve the problem by ordering the Wehrmacht, the German High Command, to plan for an offensive in the west. Such a plan would only work if German Panzer and motorized divisions could maneuver through the Ardennes Forest and move into Belgium. But Belgium was a neutral country. Hitler, however, knew that, neutral or not, Belgium would have to be invaded. Also Hitler knew if his forces were to break through the Ardennes, fort Eben Emael would first have to be taken.
    The German High Command was divided on how to take the fort. Some plans called for a massive frontal assault to capture the fort with very heavy casualties on the German side, and others considered a more rapid attack with super heavy guns firing across the Canal to neutralize the cupolas and the bunkers. Field Marshal Hermann Goering, the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, had an alternative plan to use dive bombers with bombs of sufficient penetrating power to disable the fort. None of these plans were considered practical. They were too risky, very costly in terms of human lives expended to achieve the desired goal, or the fort was considered to be impregnable to any ordnance which could be delivered from the air or fired by any gun. To frustrate matters even worse, the German intelligence about the fort was at best inadequate.
    However, Fort Eben-Emael had one major weakness. It was vulnerable to an attack from the air. Hitler and the German High Command knew that they had to capture intact the bridges over the Albert Canal if Blitzkrieg was to function. They also knew that a paratrooper attack – so devastating in Holland – would be unlikely to be successful at Eben-Emael, as it would give the defenders too much time to react as the paratroopers descended. They, therefore, decided on a mode of attack the defenders would be surprised by – the use of gliders carrying troops. The gliders would land at half-light inside the fort thus negating its defenses. Such an attack would possess a high surprise factor which would not be achieved using paratroopers.
    The attack had to be carefully coordinated so that it took place just at the same time as the main German attack across the Belgian border. In this way, the Belgian army would be fully occupied and no units outside of the fort could come to its aid.
    The raid was full of risks. Take-off and landings were potential problems. When the gliders came within range of the fort’s anti-aircraft guns, they were at risk. To compensate for the latter, the attack was planned at half-light – making the task of the glider pilots even more difficult, as visibility would be a key issue. The plan was to release the gliders 12 miles from the fort at a height of 6500 feet. The pilots selected for the raid were considered to be the best and were given a target of landing their gliders within 65 feet of their chosen target.
    The attack was entrusted to the Koch Storm Detachment formed in November 1939. The main section of this unit comprised of paratroopers, including those trained in explosives. The actual attack on the fort itself was carried out by these sappers who were led by 1st Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig. Once landed on top of the fort, they would be able to use hollow charges to destroy or disable the gun cupolas. They also could use flamethrowers against machine guns.
    The unit led by Witzig trained for six months for this attack. They were to use 11 gliders and the glider pilots were also expected to fight in the attack. Each glider was to fly seven or eight men, excluding the pilot. Each glider unit had two targets to attack. The sappers carried large quantities of explosives and such weapons as flame throwers.
    The attackers landed at 05:25 on May 10th 1940, five minutes before the main attack across the Belgian border. To confuse the Belgian military around the area, the Germans also used dummy gliders that ‘landed’ in areas around the canal, but served no other purpose than to confuse the defenders. Nine of the eleven gliders got through to the fort – one glider being lost to anti-aircraft fire and one having to land just outside of Cologne as its towrope had broken.
    The paratroopers landed on the "roof" of the fortress. There they were able to use the hollow charges to destroy or disable the gun cupolas. They also used a flamethrower against machine guns. The Belgians did destroy one of the key bridges, preventing it from being used by the Germans.
    The Koch Storm Detachment had given themselves just 60 minutes to create a base in the fort which they could defend. In this time, they destroyed many of the gun emplacements in the fort and captured a large section of it. Some of the complex remained in the hands of the Belgian army, but by May 11th, the fight was over, as the advancing German army arrived in force. Confronted with an enemy literally, within, and surrounded by a massive army without, the defenders had no real choice but to surrender.
    The entire force used by the Germans numbered 76 paratroopers and 9 glider pilots. They belonged to the German 7th Parachute Division. To land on the fortress, they used gliders type DFS 230 which were considered, at the time, the best military gliders in the world. One day later, they were reinforced by the German 151st Infantry Regiment that came across the Canal. At 13:30 hours on 11 May, the fortress surrendered. Almost 1200 Belgian soldiers were captured.
    The attack was a success for the Germans, as the fort was taken and the vital bridges captured intact. The Germans lost 6 men killed out of the 85 who set out on the attack with 15 wounded. The Belgian defenders lost 23 men killed and 59 wounded.
    The attack on Fort Eben-Emael shows how blitzkrieg worked within a small environment, as opposed to an attack on a whole country. The element of surprise was a key factor, as was the use of a method of attack not really considered possible by other Western European armies. The use of paratroops specifically trained to become experts in explosives, and landing with gliders in such a confined space was also vital. The defensive mentality of the Belgian army was exposed by the success of the attack on Fort Eben-Emael.
    Luftwaffe General Kurt Student, commander of Germany’s paratroops forces, described the assault by his paratroopers on Fort Eben Emael as, “the greatest military victory man has ever won”. Fort Eben Emael, the French Maginot Line, and the Israeli Bar Lev Line on the Suez Canal in 1973, all proved to be futile against a determined and creative attacker.
    After its capture, the fort was evaluated for use as an underground factory for the V-1 rocket, but production was never undertaken at Eben Emael.
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